

Visualization-supported Analysis of System Data for Controlled VMI-based Intrusion Detection

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- Motivation
- Controlled & cost-aware monitoring architecture
- VMI-based system call tracing use-case
- Conclusion & Future work



Visualization-supported analysis

- System level data visualization
- In-depth: Combination of multiple data sources
- Interactive

VMI-based security monitoring


- VMI properties: Isolation, Inspection and Interposition
- Performance overhead

Controlled VMI-based intrusion detection

- On-demand monitoring
- Cost-aware
- Trade-off between enriched data and performance overhead

Architecture






Visualization-supported & cost-aware architecture: components and workflow

Architecture - Input phase






Data sources

- Standard data sources at OS, applications (log files), network levels (traces)
- VMI-based monitoring mechanisms (built on-top of LibVMI)

Streaming server: Apache Kafka

Architecture - Transform phase





Processing server


- Subscribes to data stream
- Apache Spark

Transformation operations

- Event filtering, coorelation, aggregation & summarization
- Complex analysis like Machine learning

Architecture - Visualize phase





Dashboard


- Interactivity
- on-demand monitoring

Visualization backend

- RESTful web service for data retrieval
- Interface to the monitoring components

Architecture - Predict phase





Prediction engine

- In-depth monitoring \rightarrow richer data \rightarrow higher overhead
- Cost prediction for reasonable choice of monitoring mechanism
- Assumptions: impact correlates to frequency of monitored events



Metrics

- T_m : sampling time to trigger tracing mechanism $i \ (i \in E)$
- t_i: impact of monitoring a single event of i
- f_i : frequency of events of type *i* captured during T_m
- $\theta = \sum_{i \in E} f_i \times t_i$: Monitoring work during T_m
- ▶ $\lambda = \frac{\theta}{T_m}$: Fraction of total time consumed by monitoring
- ► $\epsilon = \frac{\theta}{T_m \theta}$: Indicates increase of runtime due to monitoring
- $T' = (1 + \epsilon)T$: Total execution time



Use case: VMI-based system call monitoring

- Predict impact of tracing system calls
- Evaluate the prediction

Data source: Libvmtrace

- VMI-based library for system call and network monitoring
- Built on top of LibVMI
- Injects breakpoints for system call tracing
- Not yet optimized for perfomance
- Libvmtrace vs. other system call tracing libraries
 - selectively monitor system calls of interest



Metrics

- Set t_i: trace a single system call
- t_i can be determined offline

sys.call	Total(s)	Overhead(s)	Count	<i>t₁/call</i> (ms)
sys_read	371.6	313.7	202,950	1.54
sys_write	158.1	100.2	64,850	1.54
sys_open	660.1	602.2	977,870	0.61
sys_mmap	210.5	152.6	261,370	0.51

Table: Determining t_i using a sample application that runs 58 s without monitoring

• $t_i \pm$ constant for each system call

Use-case: VMI-based sys. call monitoring


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Tracing sys_mmap in sample program ($t_{sys_mmap} = 0.51ms$).

- sample program runtimes
 - without monitoring: 100s
 - with monitoring: 170s

Metrics

- t_i = t_{sys_mmap}
- $T_m = 100 ms$
- Sampling frequency
 - ► every 10s
 - (+) constant update of prediction
 - (−) increase in monitoring load λ




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350

Use-case: VMI-based sys. call monitoring

- Sampling frequency
 - every 10s
- Varying sampling size
 - (+) higher accuracy
 - (-) higher monitoring load



11

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sys_mmap system call distribution during monitoring runtime

The prediction accuracy is function of the distribution of the monitored system call. Challenges in:

- sampling size
- sampling frequency
- sampling timing



- Architecture for controlled security monitoring
- Cost-aware aspect for reasonable choice of heavy monitoring
- Interactive monitoring system
 - enable / disable selected monitoring mechanisms
- Machine Learning-based intrusion detection (w. TU München)
 - monitor features of interest
 - with least impact on performance



Thank you.

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16 / 16