

# Visualization-supported Analysis of System Data for Controlled VMI-based Intrusion Detection

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- Motivation
- Controlled & cost-aware monitoring architecture
- VMI-based system call tracing use-case
- Conclusion & Future work



## Visualization-supported analysis

- System level data visualization
- In-depth: Combination of multiple data sources
- Interactive

## VMI-based security monitoring


- VMI properties: Isolation, Inspection and Interposition
- Performance overhead

## Controlled VMI-based intrusion detection

- On-demand monitoring
- Cost-aware
- Trade-off between enriched data and performance overhead

## Architecture






Visualization-supported & cost-aware architecture: components and workflow

# Architecture - Input phase






#### Data sources

- Standard data sources at OS, applications (log files), network levels (traces)
- VMI-based monitoring mechanisms (built on-top of LibVMI)

#### Streaming server: Apache Kafka

# Architecture - Transform phase





#### **Processing server**


- Subscribes to data stream
- Apache Spark

### Transformation operations

- Event filtering, coorelation, aggregation & summarization
- Complex analysis like Machine learning

## Architecture - Visualize phase





#### Dashboard


- Interactivity
- on-demand monitoring

### Visualization backend

- RESTful web service for data retrieval
- Interface to the monitoring components

# Architecture - Predict phase





### **Prediction engine**

- In-depth monitoring  $\rightarrow$  richer data  $\rightarrow$  higher overhead
- Cost prediction for reasonable choice of monitoring mechanism
- Assumptions: impact correlates to frequency of monitored events



### Metrics

- $T_m$ : sampling time to trigger tracing mechanism  $i \ (i \in E)$
- t<sub>i</sub>: impact of monitoring a single event of i
- $f_i$ : frequency of events of type *i* captured during  $T_m$
- $\theta = \sum_{i \in E} f_i \times t_i$ : Monitoring work during  $T_m$
- ▶  $\lambda = \frac{\theta}{T_m}$ : Fraction of total time consumed by monitoring
- ►  $\epsilon = \frac{\theta}{T_m \theta}$  : Indicates increase of runtime due to monitoring
- $T' = (1 + \epsilon)T$ : Total execution time



Use case: VMI-based system call monitoring

- Predict impact of tracing system calls
- Evaluate the prediction

Data source: Libvmtrace

- VMI-based library for system call and network monitoring
- Built on top of LibVMI
- Injects breakpoints for system call tracing
- Not yet optimized for perfomance
- Libvmtrace vs. other system call tracing libraries
  - selectively monitor system calls of interest



### Metrics

- Set t<sub>i</sub>: trace a single system call
- t<sub>i</sub> can be determined offline

sys.call	Total(s)	Overhead(s)	Count	<i>t₁/call</i> (ms)
sys_read	371.6	313.7	202,950	1.54
sys_write	158.1	100.2	64,850	1.54
sys_open	660.1	602.2	977,870	0.61
sys_mmap	210.5	152.6	261,370	0.51

Table: Determining  $t_i$  using a sample application that runs 58 s without monitoring

### • $t_i \pm$ constant for each system call

Use-case: VMI-based sys. call monitoring


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Tracing sys\_mmap in sample program ( $t_{sys_mmap} = 0.51ms$ ).

- sample program runtimes
  - without monitoring: 100s
  - with monitoring: 170s

### Metrics

- t<sub>i</sub> = t<sub>sys\_mmap</sub>
- $T_m = 100 ms$
- Sampling frequency
  - ► every 10s
  - (+) constant update of prediction
  - (−) increase in monitoring load λ




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Use-case: VMI-based sys. call monitoring

- Sampling frequency
  - every 10s
- Varying sampling size
  - (+) higher accuracy
  - (-) higher monitoring load



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sys\_mmap system call distribution during monitoring runtime

The prediction accuracy is function of the distribution of the monitored system call. Challenges in:

- sampling size
- sampling frequency
- sampling timing



- Architecture for controlled security monitoring
- Cost-aware aspect for reasonable choice of heavy monitoring
- Interactive monitoring system
  - enable / disable selected monitoring mechanisms
- Machine Learning-based intrusion detection (w. TU München)
  - monitor features of interest
  - with least impact on performance



### Thank you.

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