Implementierung gemischt kritischer Systeme durch statische Hardwarepartitionierung

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Motivation: Mixed Criticality

- Driven by consolidation of physical hardware units [1]
- SMP is everywhere
- Reduction of physical control units
- **System of systems** on a chip
  - Increasing complexity
  - Scalability
  - Maintainability
- Consolidation of multiple software stacks requires safe isolation



Separate Automotive Control Units

Image © CVEL



Is Linux Kernel Development Good Enough to Make Your Life Depend on It?

Image © Lukas Bulwahn

Main Architecture Decisions:

- Safety-critical and non-safety critical applications run on the same kernel
- Isolation is achieved with:
  - **CPU shielding**
  - use of dedicated cores and memory regions
- Unintended behavior of safety-critical applications is limited with **seccomp**
- System and applications are monitored with an application on a dedicated core
- Safety-critical applications use **glibc**



SIL2LinuxMP High-Level Architecture

Hypervisor-assisted solutions

- **Quest-V** [2]
  - Allows direct I/O access
  - Rich set of device drivers (OS + VMM)
  - Virtualisation *only* for isolation
  - Communication: Shared memory + IPI
  - Only trap on violations
  - Traditional boot sequence
- **PikeOS** [3]
- **XtratuM** [4], **LTZvisor** [5], ...

QUEST



Quest-V overview

Images © Rich West

Hypervisor-assisted solutions

- **Quest-V** [2]
- **PikeOS** [3]
  - Allows direct I/O access
  - Paravirtualisation, hardware-assisted virtualisation
  - Time or Event triggered scheduling
- **XtratuM** [4], **LTZvisor** [5], . . .



PikeOS architecture

Images © SYSGO AG

Jailhouse



Yet another hypervisor?

Jailhouse [6], an *Exohypervisor*

- Minimalist hypervisor skeleton (cf. Exokernel approach [7])
- **Offload uncritical work to Linux**
  - System boot and initialisation
  - Partition »*cell*« management
  - Control and monitoring
  - Deferred VMM activation

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

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

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

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

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

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

3. Operational phase

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

(Dev: Destroy cells)

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

(Dev: Disable hypervisor)

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

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- **Prefer simplicity over features**
  - Partition booted system
    instead of booting Linux
  - Resource access control
    instead of resource virtualisation
  - 1:1 static resource assignment
    instead of scheduling

Small code-base and tiny impact

- $\approx$ 7kLoC on armv7
  - Simplifies certification efforts
  - Suitable basis for formal verification
- Try to hide (reduce traps), but don't hide existence
- #Partitions $\leq$ #CPUs, sufficient for many real-world use cases
- $\Rightarrow$ Maintain real-time capabilities *by design*

Example use cases



No VM Exits! (x86)


Jailhouse Hypervisor
Core 0
Core 1
Core 2
Core 3
Devices


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
Embedded With RTEMS
Zephyr
Jailhouse Hypervisor
Core 0
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
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Burn-in test

- Typical mixed-criticality scenario
- Linux/RTOS as common use case
  - uncritical: computer vision task, video streaming
  - critical: flight control (hardware and software)
- Legacy software stack
- Jailhouse support out of the box
- Only **board support**

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

Conclusion

- Solid testament for implementing real-time safety critical systems with Jailhouse
- Jailhouse as platform or playground for other academic approaches
- Hardware/Software codesign towards zero traps

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Future Work

- Linux mainline integration (Ongoing!)
- Safety certification (Ongoing!)
- Make Jailhouse Linux agnostic (WIP by TI)
- Sound quantification of hypervisor influence (there *are* certain traps)
- Consider extending jailhouse for heterogeneous architectures
  - +GPU
  - +FPGA
  - +PRU

Thank you!

https://github.com/siemens/jailhouse
<jailhouse-dev@googlegroups.com>

<ralf.ramsauer@othr.de>, <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>

[1] Manfred Broy. “Challenges in Automotive Software Engineering”. In: *Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE)*. (Shanghai, China). New York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2006, pp. 33–42.

[2] Ye Li, Richard West, and Eric Missimer. “A Virtualized Separation Kernel for Mixed Criticality Systems”. In: *Proceedings of the 10th USENIX International Conf. on Virtual Execution Environments (VEE)*. 2014.

[3] Robert Kaiser and Stephan Wagner. “Evolution of the PikeOS microkernel”. In: *First International Workshop on Microkernels for Embedded Systems*. 2007, p. 50.

[4] Alfons Crespo, Ismael Ripoll, and Miguel Masmano. “Partitioned Embedded Architecture based on Hypervisor: The XtratuM approach”. In: *Proceedings of the 8th European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC)*. IEEE. 2010.

[5] Sandro Pinto, Jorge Pereira, Tiago Gomes, Adriano Tavares, and Jorge Cabral. “LTZVisor: TrustZone is the Key”. In: *LIPIcs-Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics*. Vol. 76. Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik. 2017.

[6] Ralf Ramsauer, Jan Kiszka, Daniel Lohmann, and Wolfgang) Mauerer. “Look Mum, no VM Exits! (Almost)”. In: *Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Operating System Platforms for Embedded Real-Time Applications (OSPERT)*. 2017.

[7] Dawson R. Engler, M. Frans Kaashoek, and James O’Toole. “Exokernel: An Operating System Architecture for Application-Level Resource Management”. In: *Proceedings of the 15th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP)*. 1995, pp. 251–266.

[8] Udo Steinberg and Bernhard Kauer. “NOVA: A Microhypervisor-based Secure Virtualization



raw inmate: timed event loop (GIC demo)

cyclic timer interrupt, measure jitter

- `$ modprobe jailhouse`
- `$ jailhouse enable tk1.cell`
- `$ jailhouse cell create tk1-demo.cell`
- `$ jailhouse cell load tk1-demo gic-demo.bin`
- `$ jailhouse cell start tk1-demo`



raw inmate: timed event loop (GIC demo)

```
Initializing Jailhouse hypervisor v0.7 (26-g918bec06) on CPU 1
Code location: 0xf0000040
Initializing processors:
 CPU 1... OK
 CPU 2... OK
 CPU 0... OK
 CPU 3... OK
Activating hypervisor
Created cell "jetson-tk1-demo"
Page pool usage after cell creation: mem 82/16107, remap 69/131072
Cell "jetson-tk1-demo" can be loaded
Started cell "jetson-tk1-demo"
Initializing the GIC...
Initializing the timer...
Timer fired, jitter:   3083 ns, min:   3083 ns, max:   3083 ns
Timer fired, jitter:   2333 ns, min:   2333 ns, max:   3083 ns
Timer fired, jitter:   2416 ns, min:   2333 ns, max:   3083 ns
Timer fired, jitter:   3916 ns, min:   2333 ns, max:   3916 ns
Timer fired, jitter:   3749 ns, min:   2333 ns, max:   3916 ns
Timer fired, jitter:   3499 ns, min:   2333 ns, max:   3916 ns
[...]
```



raw inmate: timed event loop (GIC demo)

- `$ jailhouse cell destroy tk1-demo`
- `$ jailhouse disable`

```
[...]
Timer fired, jitter:   3416 ns, min:   2166 ns, max:   3916
Timer fired, jitter:   3499 ns, min:   2166 ns, max:   3916
Timer fired, jitter:   3499 ns, min:   2166 ns, max:   3916
Closing cell "jetson-tk1-demo"
Shutting down hypervisor
 Releasing CPU 2
 Releasing CPU 0
 Releasing CPU 1
 Releasing CPU 3
```