

Specialized and Secure Unikernels

GI Fachgruppentreffen SYS 2020

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The Unikraft Core-Team







Felipe Huici Chief Researcher

Simon Kuenzer Senior Researcher Sharan Santhanam Software Specialist




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Unikraft Primer




Full Stack Specialization









One application → Flat and single address space
 Isolation of multiple Unikernels/Applications by Hypervisor
 Thin kernel layer, only what application needs
 Single monolithic binary that contains OS and application
 Further advantages from specialization
 Performance and efficiency
 Small Trusted Compute Base
 Small memory footprint





Unikraft: A Specialized Library-Unikernel

- Everything is a (micro-)library
 - Decomposed OS functionality
 - Schedulers, memory allocators, VFS, network stacks, ...
 - Architectures, platform support, drivers
 - Virtualization environments, bare-metal
 - Application interfaces
 - POSIX, Linux system call ABI, language runtimes
 - Specialization
 - Highly configurable
 - Only required features

Linux-style configuration and building

- Kconfig-based configuration
- make-based build system: Builds each library and links them

> make menuconfig
> make



- Exit - - Help -

chitecture (x86.64)

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
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
architecture





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Application Domains






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Some numbers




Boot Times












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
Minimal Memory Requirement







NGINX Performance (kReq/s)










Redis Performance







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Unikraft and Security



Background

April 2019 NCC Group published "Assessing Unikernel Security"

Focused on

Rumprun

IncludeOS

Demonstrated vulnerability

nccgroup

NCC Group Whitepaper Assessing Unikernel Security

April 2, 2019 - Version 1.0

Prepared by Spancer Michaels Jul Drien

Unixemels are small, specialized, single-address space machine images constructed by treating component applications and driven like libraries and compiling them, along with a kernel and a thin CG layer, into a single binary blob. Proponents of unisamels claim that their smaller codebane and lack of excess services make them more efficient and secure than full-OS virtual machines and containers. We surveyed tare major uniternals, Rumprun and IncludeOS, and found that this was decidedly not the case: uniternals, which in many weys resemble embedded systems, appear to have a similarly minimal level of security. Features like ASLR, w'rs, stack catalon, beop integrity checks and more are obtain completally absent or seriously favored. If an application running on such a system contains a memory comption vulnarability, it is ohan possible for attackers to gain code execution, even in cases where the application's source and binary are unancian. Furthermore, because the application and the kennel nun togerben als a single process, an attacken who compromises a universal can isomediately exploit functionality that would sequire privilege escalation on a regular OS, e.g. arbitrary packet UO. We demonstrate such attacks on both Rumprun and IncludeOS unkernels, and recommend measures to mitigate them.



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Unikernels also need Mitigation Mechanisms!

- Most attack vectors can be mitigated with *common* techniques, for example:
 - Stack canaries
 - Page protection bits (Read/Write, Executable)
- ASLR
- Heap integrity checks
 - Compile-time obfuscation (e.g., randstruct)
 - Fuzzing and Testing

Additional protection can be achieved with the help of hypervisor, for example:

Hypercall to freeze/lock (parts of) guest page table

Other ideas

Formal-verified micro libraries

 Mixed-language Unikernel: Language selection for each micro library e.g., critical libraries written with type-safe languages





Unikraft: Micro-libraries Randomization including "kernel" components feasible Full-stack ASLR

Offline by linker (poor-man ASLR)

Randomize base address(es) during link-time

ullet Same location for all instances igodot but different for each build igodot

Online by early loader or VMM


- Statically-linked PIE Unikernel
 - Relocate kernel image
- Dynamically-linked Unikernel
 - Relocate each micro-library






Full-stack ASLR with Early Loader


1. ASLR loader relocates/loads each micro library



2. Hand-over control flow to platform library to continue bootstrapping



3. Wipe loader during bootstrapping (optional)





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Heap Integrity: Secure Memory Allocators

We are in Ring-0

 \rightarrow Direct access to low-level system components

- →In principle, lower costs for accessing them, too (no KS/US-divide)
- →Potentially, lower costs for page table modifications during allocations requests (e.g., relocation, alias pages)

In the works: Port of OSCAR¹

- Lock-and-key mechanism
- Page permissions
- How will it be perform as part of a Unikernel?




Image: [1]

[1] Oscar: A Practical Page-Permissions-Based Scheme for Thwarting Dangling Pointers https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/dang





Other selected Topics



Language Runtimes


Serverless, FaaS, and IoT

Support applications written in higher-level language

• C++, Rust, Go, Ruby, Javascript, Python, Lua, WebAssembly

Example: WebAssembly for IoT

- Seamless programming experience from browser, to cloud, to IoT
- Trying with Mozilla and WebAssembly community







High Performance Networking

Package network function directly as VM (or bare-metal)

- Minimal OS overhead
- Minimal OS noise
- High networking performance & throughput
- Use cases: Cloud, Telco (VNFs)

First port of Intel DPDK

- Dataplane development Kit
- SDK for building high-performance VNFs
- Unikernel instead of kernel-bypassing
- Remove maintenance effort of hosting OS

Other ported applications:







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It is Open Source!



Project Timeline


Early 2017: NEC-Internal project launch; 0.1

- Build system
- Initial port from Mini-OS and Solo5/KVM
- Dec/2017: Public Launch; RELEASE-0.2 Titan
 - As Xen Incubator project
 - Arm32 Xen, x86 Xen, x86 KVM, x86 Linux
 - Binary buddy allocator (heap)
 - Cooperative scheduling
- Feb/2019: RELEASE-0.3 Iapetus
 - Arm64 support for KVM
 - Networking (uknetdev, lwip, virtio-net)
 - Initial VFS with in-RAM filesystem
 - newlib
- Feb/2020: RELEASE-0.4 Rhea
 - Support for External platforms, starting with Solo5
 - Language support: C++, Python, Go, Lua, JavaScript, WebAssembly, Ruby
 - Tracepoint subsystem
 - 9pfs filesystem support (Xen, KVM)
 - Libraries: musl (initial) intel-intrinsics, libunwind, libuuid, pthreadembedded, compiler-rt, eigen, fp16, fxdiv, pthreadpool, etc.





Contributions over Time (Signed-off-by's)



Snapshot from end of June 2020



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Join us!



Project page

Sources

•www.unikraft.org

• github.com/unikraft

Documentation

•docs.unikraft.org

Contributing





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Unikraft

minios-devel@lists.xen.org (Shared mailing list)

https://patchwork.unikraft.org



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