# FlexOS: Towards Flexible OS Isolation


**Hugo Lefeuvre**<sup>1</sup>, Vlad-Andrei Bădoiu<sup>2</sup>, Alexander Jung<sup>3,4</sup>, Stefan Teodorescu<sup>2</sup>, Sebastian Rauch<sup>5</sup>, Felipe Huici<sup>6,4</sup>, Costin Raiciu<sup>2,7</sup>, Pierre Olivier<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The University of Manchester, <sup>2</sup>Politehnica Bucharest, <sup>3</sup>Lancaster University, <sup>4</sup>Unikraft.io, <sup>5</sup>Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, <sup>6</sup>NEC Labs Europe, <sup>7</sup>Correct Networks


FGBS'22, 17<sup>th</sup> - 18<sup>th</sup> March 2022




OS security/isolation strategies are **fixed** at design time! Isolation granularity, underlying mechanisms, data sharing strategies (copy/share)



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


OS security/isolation strategies are **fixed** at design time! Isolation granularity, underlying mechanisms, data sharing strategies (copy/share)




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Isolation granularity, underlying mechanisms, data sharing strategies (copy/share)




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
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### FlexOS: Flexible Isolation




Decouple security/isolation decisions from the OS design



### FlexOS: Flexible Isolation




Decouple security/isolation decisions from the OS design



### FlexOS: Flexible Isolation



Decouple security/isolation decisions from the OS design





#### Deployment to heterogeneous hardware

Make optimal use of each machine/architecture's safety mechanisms with the same code



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#### Quickly isolate vulnerable libraries React easily and quickly to newly published vulnerabilities while waiting for a full patch



#### Deployment to heterogeneous hardware

Make optimal use of each machine/architecture's safety mechanisms with the same code



Incremental verification of code-bases

Mix and match verified and non-verified code-bases while preserving guarantees



#### Quickly isolate vulnerable libraries

React easily and quickly to newly published vulnerabilities while waiting for a full patch

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

1

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...the more applications run together, the least specialization you can achieve

1

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**Full-system** (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



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Not "only application" or "only kernel": consider everything and **specialize** 

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Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

**Full-system** (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



Not "only application" or "only kernel": consider everything and **specialize** 

Embrace the **library OS philosophy:** everything is a library... network stack, nginx, libopenssl, sound driver, etc.

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

**Full-system** (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



3

Abstract away the technical details of isolation mechanisms

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

**Full-system** (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization



3

Abstract away the technical details of isolation mechanisms

Page table, MPK, CHERI, TEEs? Not the same guarantees, but a similar interface can be achieved.

1

Focus on **single-purpose appliances** such as cloud microservices

**Full-system** (*OS+app*) understanding of compartmentalization




3

Abstract away the technical details of isolation mechanisms


Flexibility must not get into the way of performance







		config.yaml
<pre>compartments: - comp1: mechanism: intel-mpk default: True - comp2: mechanism: intel-mpk hardening: [cfi, asan] libraries: - libredis: comp1 - libopenjpg: comp2 - lwip: comp2</pre>	<ul> <li>comp1: mechanism: in default: True</li> <li>comp2: mechanism: i hardening: [c libraries:</li> <li>libredis: com</li> <li>libopenjpg: c</li> </ul>	ntel-mpk fi, asan] p1


"Redis image with two compartments, isolate libopenjpeg and lwip together"







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





"Redis image with two compartments, isolate libopenjpeg and lwip together"









Based on a highly modular LibOS design (Unikraft)



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


Such libOSes are composed of *fine-granular*, *independent* libraries

<b>C</b>	1:1	
Core	LIDr	aries

boot	sched	mm
------	-------	----

Kernel & User Libs




Based on a highly modular LibOS design (Unikraft)

Core Libraries



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
Reuse libraries as finest granularity of compartmentalization

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granularity of



Core Libraries

#### Based on a highly modular LibOS design (Unikraft)


Such libOSes are composed of *fine-granular*, *independent* libraries

Reuse libraries as finest granularity of compartmentalization

"Pre-compartmentalize" them

Cross-library calls and shared data are replaced by an abstract construct (gates, data sharing primitives)

Core Libraries







At build time, these abstract constructs are replaced with a particular implementation by the toolchain. These implementations are defined by the **backends**.








int rc, connfd; char buf[512]; /\* ... \*/ rc = recv(connfd, buf, 512, 0);



























Implementation on top of Unikraft

Backend implementations for Intel MPK and VMs (EPT)

Port of libraries: network stack, scheduler, filesystem, time subsystem

Port of applications: Redis, Nginx, SQLite, iPerf server











Implementation on top of Unikraft

Backend implementations for Intel MPK and VMs (EPT)

Port of libraries: network stack, scheduler, filesystem, time subsystem

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more results in our paper 🙂






This talk: focus on demonstrating **flexibility and performance** 



48


### Flexibility



Flexibility




Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s



Flexibility



Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s



FlexOS libraries used in the Redis image (only a subset for readability):

- Redis application
- C standard library (newlib)
- FlexOS scheduler (*uksched*)
- Network stack (lwip)

Flexibility



Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s One configuration and its associated performance (80 configurations in total) Redis GET /s (x1000) 16000erage newlib  $\circ \bullet$ 0 00  $0 | \bullet | 0$  $|0|0|\bullet|$ 000 00 00 uksched wip


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Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s



The color of boxes indicates the compartment:

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
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Compartment 2 Compartment 1 Compartment 3

Flexibility



Runtime performance with Redis in requests/s



Compartment 1


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


Hardening off




The dot whether hardening (ASan, Safestack, etc.) is enabled:

Compartment 2




• Hardening on








# Flexibility



# Flexibility







③ Similar performance, very different properties!

need to reason about communication patterns, fast paths





Hardening off C


Compartment 1

Compartment 2

























compartments with the page table)












1 No overhead when disabling isolation – you only pay for what you get



2 The MPK backend compares very positively to competing solutions



2 The MPK backend compares very positively to competing solutions Tricky comparison with CubicleOS - they're using linuxu, a Linux userland debug platform of Unikraft



3 The EPT backend too compares positively to competing solutions

# Exploring the Design Space

Now, we've a nice framework!

We can leverage FlexOS to get the most secure image for a given performance budget!

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
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




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


How can we reason about security/performance trade-offs?




What we propose: consider configurations as a partially ordered set (poset)

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


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


What we propose: consider configurations as a partially ordered set (poset)


Two configurations that do not share a path are simply not comparable



We can then label each node with performance characteristics (in practice no need to label everything)




Based on this ordering and labeling we can choose the last node of each path that satisfies the performance constraints




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Let the user do the final choice





Curated list of optimal configurations




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




Curated list of optimal configurations



#### Applying POSets on Redis



Reduction of 80 configurations to 5 candidates

#### Micro/ Micro/ Separation kernels Monolithic kernels Monolithic Representation Monolithic Kernels Monolithic Kernels

#### There is a **need for isolation flexibility**

In a Nutshell

- OS Specialization, hardware heterogeneity
- or quickly react to vulnerabilities!

Current approaches: one isolation approach at design time

Decouple isolation from the OS design:

- Make isolation decisions at **build time**
- Explore **performance v.s. security trade-offs**

#### Interested?



#### Get in touch!

Webpage: <a href="https://project-flexos.github.io/">https://project-flexos.github.io/</a> Our ASPLOS'22 paper: <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3503222.3507759">https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3503222.3507759</a> By e-mail: <a href="https://busculation.org">https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3503222.3507759</a>

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